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POLICING PUBLIC COMPANIES: AN EMPIRICAL 
EXAMINATION OF THE ENFORCEMENT LANDSCAPE AND 
THE ROLE PLAYED BY STATE SECURITIES REGULATORS 
Amanda M. Rose* & Larry J. LeBlanc† 
Abstract 
Multiple different securities law enforcers can pursue U.S. public 
companies for the same misconduct. These enforcers include a variety 
of federal agencies, class action attorneys, and derivative litigation 
attorneys, as well as fifty separate state regulators. Scholars and policy 
makers have increasingly questioned whether the benefits of this multi-
enforcer approach are worth the costs, or whether a more coordinated 
and streamlined securities enforcement regime might lead to efficiency 
gains. How serious are these concerns? And what role do state 
regulators play in the enforcement mix? Whereas the enforcement 
efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission and class action 
lawyers have been well-studied, almost no empirical research has been 
done on state enforcement. 
This Article provides an empirical foundation for considering these 
questions. We reviewed the Item 3 “material litigation” disclosures in 
the fiscal year 2004–2006 Form 10-Ks filed by every domestic public 
company that listed common stock on the New York Stock Exchange at 
any time from 2000–2010—a total of 5,441 Form 10-Ks filed by 1,977 
distinct companies. In our unique dataset, 72% of companies disclosed 
some form of material litigation over the span of the three-year period 
examined, and 27% disclosed some form of securities litigation. 
Remarkably, well over half of the companies that disclosed securities 
litigation reported facing two or more different forms of securities 
litigation, and nearly 30% reported facing three or more.  
The securities-related state matters disclosed in our dataset share 
some interesting characteristics. They tended to target out-of-state firms 
(68%) and to involve scandals that beset the financial industry (85%). 
Overwhelmingly, they were accompanied by a related federal action or 
investigation (91%), and very often were accompanied by related 
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private litigation (67%). Whereas only 34% of states have an elected (as 
opposed to appointed) securities regulator, these states were responsible 
for 80% of the state matters disclosed. We ran regressions controlling 
for other variables that might influence a state’s level of enforcement 
activity. Our statistically significant results indicate that states with 
elected enforcers brought securities-related matters at more than four 
times the rate of other states, and states with an elected Democrat 
serving as the securities regulator brought matters at nearly seven times 
the rate of other states.  
Our findings bring into focus several important public policy 
questions concerning the use of multiple securities law enforcers in 
general, and the social value of state enforcement in particular, that 
merit further exploration. 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 396 
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INTRODUCTION 
American public companies frequently complain that they operate in 
an “overly litigious” business environment. While the litigation risk 
they face spans a dizzying array of areas, securities litigation risk is 
often singled out for especially harsh criticism. This is due in part to 
America’s use of multiple securities law enforcers. These enforcers 
include a variety of federal public and quasi-public bodies (such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Department of Justice 
(DOJ), and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)), as well 
as private class action attorneys, private derivative litigation attorneys, 
and fifty separate state regulators. Each of these enforcers may act 
independently of the others, giving rise to the possibility of expensive 
duplicate litigation and inconsistent enforcement policies. While the 
intensity of U.S. securities law enforcement likely plays an important 
role in keeping the cost of capital low for U.S. listed firms, numerous 
scholars have questioned whether more streamlined enforcement efforts 
2
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might achieve the same or better results at lower cost.1 
What is missing from this debate is a good sense of the magnitude of 
the potential problem. How often do U.S. public companies experience 
litigation generally, and securities litigation specifically? And how often 
are they targeted by multiple securities law enforcers? Also missing 
from the debate is  a good sense of the enforcement role played by state 
securities regulators. While the role of federal public enforcement and 
private class action enforcement of the securities laws has been well-
studied,2 almost no empirical research has been done on state 
enforcement.3 Congress broadly preempted ex ante state regulation of 
public companies’ securities offerings and disclosure documents in the 
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), but 
explicitly preserved state authority to bring government enforcement 
actions against these companies “[for] fraud or deceit, or unlawful 
conduct by a broker or dealer, in connection with securities or securities 
transactions.”4 The targeting of public companies by Eliot Spitzer and his 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud 
on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 69–70 (2011) (arguing that fraud-on-the-market securities 
class actions should be eliminated and replaced with stepped-up public enforcement efforts); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 
304 (2007) (suggesting that flaws in private securities enforcement may warrant increased 
reliance on public enforcement); Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An 
Empirical Examination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 49, 81 (2011) (arguing for more targeted deterrence of 
corporate fraud); Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public And Private Enforcement of 
Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 209 (2009) (questioning the 
effectiveness of private enforcement relative to public enforcement); Amanda M. Rose, The 
Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
2173, 2176 (2010) (questioning whether the preconditions for efficient use of multiple securities 
law enforcers exist in the United States and arguing for greater centralization of enforcement 
efforts); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the 
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
1301–02 (2008) (arguing that SEC oversight of securities class actions would lead to efficiency 
gains); see also COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 9–10, 68–69 (2006), http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30 
Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (recommending reforms to encourage greater 
coordination between state and federal securities regulators).    
 2. For helpful summaries of the extant literature, see James D. Cox & Randall S. 
Thomas, Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical 
Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Laws, 6 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 164, 170 
(2009). For an older survey focused on private enforcement, see Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence 
on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1468–1504 (2004).  
 3. Some recent empirical work has been done on private enforcement under state law. 
See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 1, at 53; Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State 
Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 349, 349–53 (2012). Our focus here, however, is on public 
enforcement by state regulators.  
 4. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. In 1998, Congress also broadly preempted 
securities class actions based on state law, with important carve-outs for traditional corporate 
3
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successors as New York Attorney General has led some to praise and 
others to criticize NSMIA’s “fraud carve-out,” as it has come to be known. 
But beyond anecdotal accounts of New York’s high-profile enforcement 
efforts, we know little about how states have utilized their preserved 
authority. 
This Article responds to these important foundational questions. We 
examined the fiscal year (FY) 2004, FY 2005, and FY 2006 Form 10-
Ks filed by every domestic U.S. company that listed common stock on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) at any point in the last 
decade—a total of 5,441 Form 10-Ks filed by 1,977 different firms. 
Specifically, we examined the “material litigation” disclosures found in 
Item 3 of these Form 10-Ks, recording whether the companies disclosed 
any material litigation and, if so, whether they disclosed securities 
litigation.5 If a company disclosed securities litigation, we tracked 
which of the following four forms of securities litigation it disclosed: a 
class action; a derivative action; a federal regulatory action or 
investigation; or a state regulatory action or investigation. We also 
recorded additional information about the securities-related state 
enforcement actions and investigations disclosed, such as the identity of 
the enforcing state, their topic, and whether they overlapped with 
related federal or private enforcement efforts.  
Our findings support the contention that American public companies 
operate in a highly litigious business environment generally, and that 
they confront significant enforcement in the securities law area in 
particular—often at the hands of multiple different enforcers. Of the 
companies in our dataset, 72% disclosed that they faced some form of 
material litigation over the course of the three years examined and 27% 
disclosed some form of securities litigation—with two in every ten 
disclosing a securities class action. Remarkably, 56% of the companies 
that disclosed securities litigation reported at least two forms of 
securities litigation, and 28% reported three or more. Moreover, nearly 
40% of companies that disclosed a federal regulatory action or 
investigation at the hands of the SEC also disclosed that at least one 
other federal regulator, such as the DOJ, had targeted them. One cannot 
conclude from these findings that the securities laws are being overly 
                                                                                                                     
law litigation. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.  
 5. Form 10-K filers are required to disclose any material pending legal proceedings, 
other than ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which they, a subsidiary, or 
their property is subject. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2012). We focused on Form 10-Ks filed for 
the fiscal years 2004–2006 because these were the most recent that would disclose mostly 
completed securities litigation. See, e.g., Jordan Milev, Robert Patton & Svetlana Starykh, 
Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2011 Mid-Year Review, NERA ECON. 
CONSULTING 14, Fig. 16 (2011), http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Mid-Year_Trends_0711 
(3).pdf.  
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enforced, but the findings do suggest that policymakers should consider 
seriously whether more streamlined enforcement efforts might lead to 
efficiency gains.  
Our findings also illuminate the enforcement role state securities 
regulators play. Just 8% of the companies in our dataset that disclosed 
some form of securities litigation disclosed a securities-related state 
enforcement action or investigation, as compared to 74% for class 
actions, 48% for derivative actions, and 45% for a federal regulatory 
action or investigation. Although few in number, the disclosed 
securities-related state enforcement actions and investigations share 
several interesting characteristics. They were largely: directed at out-of-
state companies (that is, those neither headquartered nor incorporated in 
the enforcing state) (68%); targeted at firms in the financial sector 
(93%); and aimed at misconduct implicating an industry-wide scandal, 
as opposed to isolated instances of firm-specific misconduct (85%). 
Moreover, the vast majority involved at least one overlapping 
investigation or action by another securities law enforcer (93%).  
Our findings also reveal important differences in state securities 
enforcement behavior. A clear majority of the states (thirty-two) were 
not identified as pursuing any securities enforcement efforts against the 
public companies in our dataset. Fourteen states were identified as 
pursuing between one and four distinct enforcement actions or 
investigations, while four states—New York, West Virginia, 
Connecticut, and Massachusetts—were responsible for 70% of the total 
number of state actions and investigations disclosed, each bringing 
between eight and thirty-one.  
There was also a marked difference between the enforcement 
behavior of states with elected securities regulators and that of states 
with appointed securities regulators. Whereas 36% of states have an 
elected securities regulator, these states were responsible for 80% of the 
matters disclosed. We ran regressions controlling for other variables 
that might influence a state’s level of enforcement activity. Our 
statistically significant results indicate that states with elected enforcers 
brought matters at more than four times the rate of states with appointed 
enforcers. Notably, states with an elected Democrat serving as the 
securities regulator brought matters at nearly seven times the rate of 
other states. Our findings thus support the claim that states’ pursuit of 
public companies for securities-related misconduct has a partisan 
political dimension.6  
This Article represents an important first step in understanding the 
role state regulators play in policing public companies for securities-
                                                                                                                     
 6. In the time frame studied, both the SEC and the Presidency were controlled by 
Republicans.  
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related misconduct. Additional research, both theoretical and empirical, 
would help answer the key questions this Article brings into focus. For 
example, is it wise to rely on elected state regulators to supplement the 
enforcement efforts of the SEC, an agency that was specifically 
designed to remain insulated from political pressures? And what 
motivates certain states to police public companies in this area, while 
the vast majority chooses not to? Better understanding state motivations 
would help in determining the likely social value of NSMIA’s fraud 
carve-out, and might inform expectations about state enforcement 
behavior vis-à-vis public companies in other important legal areas. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes 
our data collection process and offers descriptive statistics on the 
companies in our dataset. Part II provides descriptive statistics on the 
litigation disclosed by the companies in our dataset, with a detailed 
focus on the extent and types of securities litigation experienced. Part 
III provides background on the role of state securities regulators in 
policing public companies and offers statistics on the state securities 
enforcement efforts disclosed by the companies in our dataset, including 
the results of our regressions. The Article then briefly concludes, 
highlighting avenues of further research that our dataset open up.  
 
I.  OVERVIEW OF DATASET  
A.  Data Collection Process 
One of our primary goals in conducting this research was to find out 
more about the role that state regulators have played in policing public 
companies for securities fraud. No one has previously compiled 
comprehensive information about state securities enforcement efforts 
targeting this population of firms, and this information is not readily 
available through state-based sources. We therefore chose to consult the 
Form 10-K that public companies are required to file with the SEC on 
an annual basis and which is readily available on the SEC’s website.7 
Specifically, Part I, Item 3, of the Form 10-K requires filers to 
                                                                                                                     
 7. In the time frame examined, a company could become obligated to file a Form 10-K 
in three ways: (1) if its stock traded on a national securities exchange, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) 
(2006); (2) if it had more than $10 million in assets and equity securities held by more than 500 
record owners, id. § 78m(f); or (3) if it had filed a registration statement with the SEC that had 
gone effective pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933. Id. § 78o(d). Companies who triggered 
reporting obligations in the first way could subsequently avoid them by delisting. Companies 
who triggered them in the second way could subsequently avoid them if the number of owners 
of their equity securities dropped below 300, or if for three years they consistently had fewer 
than 500 such owners and fewer than $10 million in assets, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4 (2011). 
Finally, reporting obligations triggered in the third manner described above could be suspended 
one year after the offering if (and so long as) the number of owners of the securities to which the 
registration statement related was below 300, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d). 
6
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“[d]escribe briefly any material pending legal proceedings, other than 
ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which the 
registrant or any of its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their 
property is subject.”8 Filers are instructed to provide certain basic 
information about such proceedings, as well as about “any such 
proceedings known to be contemplated by governmental authorities.”9 
We examined the Item 3 disclosures in the FY 2004, FY 2005, and FY 
2006 Form 10-Ks filed by U.S. companies that listed common stock on 
the NYSE at some point in the first decade of the twenty-first century.10 
The NYSE is by far the largest U.S. stock exchange in terms of market 
capitalization; focusing on firms that listed common stock on that 
exchange over a ten-year period thus gives us a window into the 
litigation experiences of a broad set of U.S. public companies.11 We 
focused on these firms’ disclosed litigation experiences in the fiscal 
years 2004–2006 in order to maximize the likelihood that the litigation 
would be completed.12  
To identify the companies whose Form 10-Ks we would examine, 
we consulted three sources of NYSE data. First, we consulted the 
NYSE’s online directory of U.S. companies listing common stock.13 
Each company listed in that directory on December 9, 2010, is captured 
in our dataset if it filed a Form 10-K for the years 2004, 2005, or 
2006.14 Second, we consulted the NYSE’s March 2000 issue of Stocks 
& Bonds on the New York Stock Exchange, which catalogues all firms 
listing common stock on the NYSE on February 29, 2000. We then 
added to the dataset any U.S. firms identified by that source, provided 
that they had filed a Form 10-K for the year 2004, 2005, or 2006. 
Lastly, we added to the dataset U.S. firms identified on the NYSE’s 
annual year-end “New Common Stock Listings” roll for any of the 
years 2000 through 2010, as long as they filed a Form 10-K for the year 
                                                                                                                     
 8. See supra note 5.  
 9. Id. 
 10. We treat as a 2004 10-K any 10-K filed for fiscal years ending after March 31, 2004 
and on or before March 31, 2005; we treat as a 2005 10-K any 10-K filed for fiscal years ending 
after March 31, 2005 and on or before March 31, 2006; we treat as a 2006 10-K any 10-K filed 
for fiscal years ending after March 31, 2006 and on or before March 31, 2007.  
 11. The market capitalization of firms listed on the NYSE was $12.4 trillion, as compared 
to $3.5 trillion for firms listed on the NASDAQ, as of March 2010. See The 15 Largest Stock 
Markets and Exchanges, TODAY FORWARD (Apr. 27, 2010), http://todayforward.typepad. 
com/todayforward/ 2010/04/the-15-largest-stock-markets-and-exchanges.html.  
 12. Securities litigation can be quite lengthy. NERA Economic Consulting reports that for 
settled securities class actions filed between January 2000 and June 2011, the average time from 
filing to completion is 4.4 years. See Milev, et al., supra note 5, at 15.  
 13. See Listings Directory, NYSE (Sept. 27, 2012, 5:03 PM) http://www.nyse.com/about/ 
listed/lc_ny_issuetype_1076458359969.html?ListedComp=US.  
 14. We drop from the dataset any company whose 10-Ks disclose a place of incorporation 
or principal executive offices outside one of the fifty U.S. states.  
7
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2004, 2005, or 2006.15 To the extent these sources are accurate and 
complete, our collection process yielded a comprehensive list of all U.S. 
companies that both (1) had common stock listed on the NYSE at any 
point between February 29, 2000, and December 31, 2010, and (2) filed 
a 2004, 2005, or 2006 Form 10-K.  
We examined each of the FY 2004–2006 Form 10-Ks filed by the 
companies we identified and recorded the following information in an 
Excel database:  
• Company name; 
• Year of report; 
• State of incorporation;  
• State of principal executive offices; 
• Whether any material litigation is disclosed in Item 3 (including 
by reference);16  
• If material litigation is disclosed, whether any of it is securities- 
related;17 
• If securities-related material litigation is disclosed: 
• Whether a securities-related class action is disclosed; 
• Whether a derivative action is disclosed; 
                                                                                                                     
 15. These publications can be accessed online for the years 2003–2007. New Common 
Stock Listings, 200x, NYSE TECHNOLOGIES, http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/NYSE/Facts 
Figures/tabid/115/Default.aspx (search “new common stock listings,” then follow “Listed 
Companies” hyperlink). We obtained them for the years 2000–2002 and 2008–2010 directly 
from the NYSE’s archivist.  
 16. We treated a company as disclosing “material litigation” in Item 3 if it provided some 
specific information about at least one piece of litigation (against the firm, one of its 
subsidiaries, or one of its officers or directors), even if the company did not disclose all of the 
details required by Item 3, and even if the company also stated that it did not think the litigation 
was material. We did not treat a company as disclosing material litigation, however, if the 
disclosure was mere boilerplate (for example, “from time to time, the company is subject to a 
variety of claims involving X, Y, and Z”). In addition to material litigation, companies must 
disclose environmental proceedings and regulatory investigations. These, if they meet the 
requirement of specificity noted above, were counted even if the investigation had not led to the 
initiation of a formal proceeding against the company. If the company disclosed that a 
shareholder had presented to the company’s board of directors a demand to bring suit, we did 
not treat this as material litigation unless the shareholder had already filed a derivative suit in 
court.  
 17. We construed “securities-related” broadly to include not just securities fraud suits, but 
also any investigations or actions initiated by the SEC (which include actions brought under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act), corporate law breach of fiduciary duty suits, litigation 
challenging a merger or acquisition, and shareholder derivative litigation. We did not treat 
ERISA matters as securities-related. Cases involving insurance presented a challenge, as some 
but not all insurance products have an investment component and have been treated as securities 
by the SEC. We treated as securities-related insurance matters that involved variable annuities, 
indexed annuities, and other “nontraditional” insurance products. Matters that were focused 
primarily on traditional fixed insurance products, or on the marketing of insurance generally 
(such as state investigations into contingent commissions and “bid rigging” in the insurance 
industry) were not treated as securities-related.  
8
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss2/2
2013] POLICING PUBLIC COMPANIES 403 
 
• Whether a securities-related federal regulatory investigation or 
action is disclosed,18 and if so, the identity of said regulator(s); 
• Whether a securities-related state regulatory investigation or 
action is disclosed,19 and if so, the identity of the responsible 
state(s), and the topic of the investigation(s) or action(s); and 
• If a securities-related state regulatory investigation or action is 
disclosed and a securities-related class action, derivative action, 
or securities-related federal regulatory investigation or action is 
disclosed, whether they are related.20 
The dataset we created is comprehensive and provides a great deal of 
useful information about the litigation experiences of an important 
group of public companies. However, it has certain limitations that 
should be acknowledged at the outset. First, it leaves out certain 
categories of companies. We chose to look at the litigation experiences 
of all U.S. companies that traded common stock on the NYSE at some 
point between 2000 and 2010 and filed 10-Ks for the year 2004, 2005, 
or 2006. We therefore did not examine firms that traded common stock 
on the NYSE at some point between 2000 and 2010 but did not file 10-
Ks for the year 2004, 2005, or 2006.21 Foreign firms and firms that 
traded only securities other than common stock on the NYSE from 
2000–2010 were likewise excluded from the analysis. And because we 
examined only the litigation experiences of U.S. companies that traded 
common stock on the NYSE at some point between 2000 and 2010, 
firms that traded exclusively on the NASDAQ or another exchange 
during that time period were also excluded from the analysis. The 
litigation experiences of the firms excluded from the dataset may differ 
from those of the firms we analyzed.  
Second, we focused on firms’ litigation experiences in the fiscal 
years 2004, 2005, and 2006.22 Enforcement patterns may change with 
the times, especially with the economic climate (with more aggressive 
enforcement generally thought to occur in the wake of a financial 
crisis). A different picture might emerge if instead we examined the 10-
                                                                                                                     
 18. These would include matters brought by the SEC, securities-related criminal matters 
brought by the DOJ (including U.S. Attorneys), and enforcement matters initiated by SEC 
supervised self-regulatory organization (SROs) (which at the time included the NASD and 
NYSE, since consolidated into FINRA).  
 19. We do not count actions brought by state pension funds or otherwise brought by states 
in a proprietary capacity to recover investment losses suffered by the state. Instead, we are 
focused on actions brought by the state in its sovereign capacity.  
 20. To answer this question sometimes required investigating additional sources outside 
the 10-K.  
 21. This means that firms that failed, were acquired, or “went dark” prior to 2004 are 
excluded from the analysis. It also means that firms that obtained public company status for the 
first time only after 2006 are excluded.  
 22. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
9
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Ks filed by the same set of companies in a different period.  
Third, it is important to note that Item 3 disclosures cannot provide a 
perfect picture of the litigation experiences of the companies in the 
dataset. For one thing, the Item 3 disclosure obligation is subject to a 
“materiality” standard. The SEC has provided some guidance on the 
type of litigation that firms should treat as material. For example, firms 
are instructed that they need not include information about litigation 
involving “primarily a claim for damages” if the amount involved does 
not exceed 10% of the company’s current assets.23 But the concept of 
materiality remains hazy and subject to interpretation, and companies 
seeking to avoid the release of negative information may interpret it in a 
self-serving way—at the very least, companies are likely to interpret the 
materiality standard in nonuniform ways.24 In addition, some companies 
may voluntarily disclose information about legal proceedings even if 
they consider them immaterial, whereas other companies may not.  
To gauge the quality and consistency of the Item 3 disclosures by the 
companies in our dataset, we compared our results with the database of 
federal securities class actions maintained by the Stanford Law School 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. The Stanford database indicates 
that federal securities class actions were filed against a total of 215 
NYSE listed firms in the years 2004–2006. Of these 215 firms, 176 are 
in our dataset (not all are in our dataset because some failed to meet 
our criteria for inclusion—for example, they were foreign, or did not 
file Form 10-Ks in any of the years 2004, 2005, or 2006.). Of the 176 
firms in our dataset, 169 filed Form 10-Ks in the year the Stanford 
database indicates a federal securities class action was filed against 
them. We recorded 157 of these 169 firms as having disclosed a 
securities-related class action in that year—indicating a disclosure rate 
of 92.9%.25  
                                                                                                                     
 23. See supra note 5, Instruction 2. It is unlikely that actions brought by state regulators 
would be treated as involving “primarily” a claim for “damages.” First, if states sought a 
monetary recovery it would be a fine or penalty, not “damages.” See supra note 19. Second, a 
final order by a state securities commissioner or like state agency finding a securities law 
violation can have serious collateral consequences for a firm. For example, it may limit the 
firm’s ability to participate in certain exempt securities offerings. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.262(a)(4) (2012) (disqualification provision of Regulation A); id. 230.505(b)(2)(iii) 
(adopting Regulation A’s disqualification provision for Rule 505 offerings under Regulation D); 
see also 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(9) (2006) (SEC may censure, deny, or suspend registration of 
investment advisor subject to final order by state securities commissioner based on fraud, 
deception, or manipulative conduct); id. § 78o(b)(4)(H) (same for brokers and dealers).  
 24. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (defining information as 
material if a “reasonable investor” would consider it significant in making an investment 
decision).  
 25. The actual disclosure rate is arguably even higher, at 94.67% (160/169). This is 
because three of the twelve companies we did not record as having disclosed a securities class 
action in their Form 10-K in the same year as the Stanford database in fact made disclosures 
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Finally, it is important to note that Item 3 asks companies to disclose 
material litigation proceedings to which they are subject, as well as to 
include “similar information as to any such proceedings known to be 
contemplated by governmental authorities.”26 When considering the 
results of our data analysis, one should keep this in mind. What we 
count as a federal or state regulatory matter may involve nothing more 
than a subpoena or request for information from the company that never 
amounts to a formal prosecution.27 
In addition to the foregoing company information culled from the 
Form 10-Ks, we collected a variety of census data related to each of the 
fifty states. We also determined whether the primary securities enforcer 
in each state was appointed or elected.28  
B.  Descriptive Statistics on Companies in Dataset 
The data collection process described above resulted in the 
identification of 1,977 distinct companies and the examination of 5,441 
Form 10-Ks. The number of Form 10-Ks we examined is less than three 
times the number of companies, because not all companies filed Form 
                                                                                                                     
likely referencing the securities class action, but due to vagueness we did not record them as 
class actions.  
 26. See supra note 5 (emphasis added).  
 27. A recent decision clarifies, however, that companies are required to disclose 
regulatory investigations only when they “mature[] to a point where litigation is apparent and 
substantially certain to occur.”  Richman v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
86556, *21 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
 28. If the department or agency primarily responsible for enforcing the state’s securities 
laws is headed by an elected (appointed) official, we treat the securities regulator as elected 
(appointed). California, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Virginia presented special cases. The 
California Department of Corporations, headed by an appointed official, has historically had 
primary responsibility for enforcing California’s securities laws; California’s elected attorney 
general could step in only upon referral by the Department of Corporations. In October 2003, 
however, a law was enacted giving the California attorney general broad concurrent authority to 
enforce the state’s securities laws. See Nicholas Campins, A New Paradigm for Securities 
Regulation in California: Senate Bill 434 and its Implications (unpublished student paper, 
National State Attorneys General Program, Columbia University), https://www.law.columbia 
.edu/center_program/ag/resources/studentpapers. We therefore treat California as a state with an 
elected securities regulator. We also classified Connecticut as a state with an elected securities 
enforcer although its appointed banking commissioner has primary formal responsibility for 
enforcing the state’s securities laws. We did so because 90% of the securities-related 
enforcement actions Connecticut was disclosed to have brought involved not its banking 
commissioner but instead its elected attorney general. With respect to no other state did a 
majority of the disclosed securities-related enforcement actions involve an elected (appointed) 
state regulator when the state regulator with formal primary authority over securities 
enforcement was appointed (elected). New Hampshire and Virginia were special cases because 
the securities regulators in those states are “elected” by the state legislature rather than 
appointed by the state governor; we believe it is appropriate to group them in the appointed 
category because the regulators are not directly exposed to popular election. The elected or 
appointed status of each state’s securities regulator is reported infra at Table 6.  
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10-Ks in each of the three years examined.29 We examined 1,843 FY 
2004 Form 10-Ks, 1,820 FY 2005 Form 10-Ks, and 1,778 FY 2006 
Form 10-Ks. Out of the 1,977 companies in the dataset, 1,822 filed 
Form 10-Ks in at least two of the years examined and 1,642 filed Form 
10-Ks in all three years.  
Table A.1 lists by state the percentage of companies in our dataset 
that disclosed each state as their state of incorporation.30 Not 
surprisingly, Delaware dominates, serving as the state of incorporation 
to 59% of the companies. Maryland, the next highest, is light-years 
away with only 9%. Table A.3 lists by state the percentage of 
companies that disclosed each state as the location of their principal 
executive offices.31 Texas, New York, and California dominate here, 
with Texas taking first—home to the principal executive offices of 12% 
of the companies in our dataset. 
As reported in Table A.5, roughly 30% of the companies in our 
dataset disclosed that their principal executive offices were located in 
their state of incorporation. If companies incorporated in Delaware are 
excluded, the number jumps to nearly 70%. This means that nearly 70% 
of companies not incorporated in Delaware were incorporated in the 
state where their principal executive offices were located. Where were 
those companies in the dataset with their principal executive offices in 
their states of incorporation located? Table A.6 shows the percentage of 
companies that disclosed each state as both the state of their principal 
executive offices and incorporation.32 Ohio tops the list, home to 10% 
of this group of companies. Table A.8 reports on the subset of 
companies disclosing states different from their state of incorporation as 
the location of their principal executive offices. Specifically, it shows 
the percentage of these companies incorporated in each state.33 
                                                                                                                     
 29. A variety of reasons could explain this. For example, a company that filed a 10-K in 
one of the years of interest might have ceased to exist in the subsequent year (because it was 
acquired, or because it went bankrupt). A company might also have escaped any obligation to 
file a 10-K by losing its public company status (“going dark”). See supra note 7 for the ways in 
which a company can do this. It is also possible that a company filed fewer than three reports 
because it went public for the first time in 2005 or 2006.  
 30. To compute these percentages, we totaled the number of times the state was identified 
as a state of incorporation in the 5,441 Form 10-Ks examined and divided by 5,441. Year-by-
year results are reported in the appendix at Table A.2.  
 31. To compute these percentages, we totaled the number of times the state was identified 
as the location of a company’s principal executive offices in the 5,441 Form 10-Ks examined 
and divided by 5,441. Year-by-year results are reported in the appendix at Table A.4.  
 32. To compute these percentages, we totaled the number of times the state was identified 
as the location of both a company’s principal executive offices and state of incorporation in the 
5,441 Form 10-Ks examined and divided by the total number of Form 10-Ks disclosing the 
same state as the location of a company’s principal executive offices and state of incorporation. 
Year-by-year results are reported in the appendix at Table A.7.  
 33. To compute these percentages, we totaled the number of times the state was identified 
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Delaware’s showing is predictably even stronger here as compared to 
Table A.1; it claims the incorporations of more than 81% of the 
companies in our dataset incorporated outside their headquarters state.  
II.  THE LITIGATION LANDSCAPE 
Our review of the Item 3 disclosures by the companies in our dataset 
strongly supports the claim that U.S. public companies face significant 
litigation risk, and in particular securities litigation risk—often at the 
hands of multiple different enforcers. This Part describes the crowded 
litigation landscape painted by our data.  
Table 1, Column A, shows the percentage of companies in the 
dataset that disclosed, in at least one of their examined Form 10-Ks, 
each type of litigation for which we recorded data (year-by-year results 
are reported in the Appendix at Table A.10.). Striking is the fact that 
72% of companies disclosed some form of material litigation over the 
course of the three-year period examined, and more than a quarter 
disclosed some form of securities litigation—with approximately two in 
every ten disclosing a securities class action.34 Column B reports on the 
subset of companies disclosing material litigation and Column C reports 
on the smaller subset disclosing securities litigation. Whereas 27% of all 
companies disclosed some form of securities litigation, 38% of the 
subset of companies that disclosed material litigation also disclosed 
some form of securities litigation. Of the smaller subset disclosing 
securities litigation, 74% disclosed a securities class action, 48% 
disclosed a derivative action, 45% disclosed a securities-related federal 
regulatory investigation or action, and 8% disclosed a securities-related 
                                                                                                                     
as the location of a company’s state of incorporation but not its principal executive offices in the 
5,441 Form 10-Ks examined and divided by the total number of reports disclosing a state of 
incorporation different than the location of a company’s principal executive offices. Year-by-
year results are reported in the appendix at Table A.9.  
 34. A total of 399 of the 1,977 firms in our dataset disclosed a securities class action in at 
least one of their reports (20.18%). We did not track whether the disclosed securities class 
action was brought under federal or state law. According to our search of the Stanford Law 
School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse database, however, at least 255 of these 399 firms 
had a federal securities class action filed against them in the 2002–2006 timeframe—
approximately 64%. The percentage of the 399 firms disclosing a federal securities class action 
is likely higher, however, for two reasons. First, the Stanford database only allowed us to sort 
for firms listed on the NYSE in the year the complaint was filed, whereas our dataset includes 
all firms that were listed on the NYSE at any point in 2000–2010 (if they met our other criteria 
for inclusion). Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, STANFORD LAW 
SCHOOL, http://securities.stanford.edu. Second, some of the firms in our dataset may have been 
reporting on federal securities class actions filed prior to 2002. See supra note 12. Even taking 
this into account, however, our data suggests a nontrivial amount of state securities class action 
litigation took place in this time period, a finding that is consistent with other empirical studies. 
See Johnson, supra note 3, at 25 Fig.1 (indicating that over 250 state law securities class actions 
were filed in the 2002–2006 timeframe against all, not just NYSE-listed, companies).  
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state regulatory investigation or action.  
 
 
Table 1. Item 3 Litigation Disclosures by Type 
 
 A B C 










Litigation 72% -- -- 
Securities 
Litigation 27% 38% -- 
Class Action 20% 28% 74% 
Derivative 
Action 13% 18% 48% 
Federal 
Regulatory 12% 17% 45% 
State 
Regulatory 2% 3% 8% 
 
Table 2 shows how often companies in the dataset disclosing 
securities litigation disclosed multiple different forms of securities 
litigation over the span of the three-year period examined.35 Well over 
half disclosed facing securities litigation at the hands of at least two 
different types of enforcers, and well over a quarter disclosed facing 
securities litigation at the hands of at least three. Table 2 also shows 
how often companies that disclosed being the target of a securities-
related state regulatory investigation or action disclosed multiple 
different forms of securities litigation over the span of the three-year 
period. The rates are dramatically higher for this subgroup—nearly all 






                                                                                                                     
 35. The forms we tracked are (1) class action, (2) derivative action, (3) federal 
regulatory investigation or action, and (4) state regulatory investigation or action.  
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Table 2. Disclosure of Multiple Forms of Securities Litigation* 
 Cos. Disclosing Securities Litigation 
Cos. Disclosing a 
Securities-Related State 
Regulatory Matter 
≥ 2 Forms of 
Securities 
Litigation 
56% (n=256/457) 98% (n=41/42) 
≥ 3 Forms of 
Securities 
Litigation 
28% (n=126/457) 76% (n=32/42) 
*Note: Limited to companies filing reports in all three years. 
 Table 3 focuses on the 243 companies that disclosed being the target 
of one or more securities-related federal regulatory investigations or 
actions, reporting how often these companies identified various federal 
regulators as being involved. The SEC was the dominant federal 
regulator, involved 98% of the time.  
 
Table 3. Securities-Related Federal Regulatory Matters by 
Enforcer 
 Cos. Disclosing a Securities-Related Federal Regulatory Matter 
Targeted by SEC 97.94% (n=238/243) 
Targeted by DOJ 30.04% (n=73/243) 
Targeted by NASD 11.11% (n=27/243) 
Targeted by NYSE 5.76% (n=14/243) 
 
Of the 238 companies in our dataset that disclosed being the target of 
an SEC investigation or action, ninety-four—nearly 40%—reported that 
they were also targeted by at least one other public or quasi-public 
federal regulator, such as the DOJ or the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD).  
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III.  STATE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 
Though states retain significant enforcement authority, their role in 
securities regulation is relatively limited today. The National Securities 
Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA) broadly preempted state 
authority to regulate the offering of “covered securities”—which 
include securities traded on national exchanges—as well as the ongoing 
disclosure obligations of the firms issuing them.36 In connection with 
NSMIA’s adoption, the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee 
of Conference described dual state–federal securities regulation as 
“redundant, costly, and ineffective,” and noted testimony that it “tends 
to raise the cost of capital to American issuers of securities without 
providing commensurate protection to investors or to our markets.”37 
Through its preemption provisions, NSMIA sought “to firmly ensconce 
the SEC as ‘the exclusive regulator of national offerings of 
securities.’”38 Two years after NSMIA’s adoption, Congress enacted the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA),39 which 
precluded most state law fraud class actions involving “covered 
                                                                                                                     
 36. NSMIA provides that:   
no law, rule, regulation, or order, or other administrative action of any State or 
any political subdivision thereof—  
(1) requiring, or with respect to, registration or qualification of securities, or 
registration or qualification of securities transactions, shall directly or indirectly 
apply to a security that— 
(A) is a covered security; or 
(B) will be a covered security upon completion of the transaction; 
(2) shall directly or indirectly prohibit, limit, or impose any conditions upon the 
use of— 
(A) with respect to a covered security . . . , any offering document that is 
prepared by or on behalf of the issuer; or 
(B) any proxy statement, report to shareholders, or other disclosure document 
relating to a covered security or the issuer thereof that is required to be and is 
filed with the Commission or any national securities organization registered 
under section 78o-3 of this title, except that this subparagraph does not apply 
to the laws, rules, regulations, or orders, or other administrative actions of the 
State of incorporation of the issuer; or 
(3) shall directly or indirectly prohibit, limit, or impose conditions, based on the 
merits of such offering or issuer, upon the offer or sale of any security 
described in paragraph (1). 
15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (2006). 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 39 (1996).  
 38. Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot 
Spitzer, 70 BROOKLYN L. REV. 117, 125 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 16 (1996)).  
 39. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 
3227 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p & 78bb) (2006).  
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securit[ies],”40 similarly defined to include securities traded on national 
exchanges.41 SLUSA was a reaction to charges that class action lawyers 
were filing securities fraud claims under state law as a way to avoid new 
restrictions on federal securities class actions created by the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Importantly, both NSMIA 
and SLUSA expressly preserved the authority of state securities 
commissions (or like state agencies) to bring enforcement actions with 
respect to fraud or deceit.42  
It was NSMIA’s fraud carve-out that allowed Eliot Spitzer to bring 
his high-profile enforcement actions to remedy perceived Wall Street 
abuses during his tenure as attorney general of New York. Spitzer 
utilized his preserved authority to initiate numerous actions against 
nationally traded companies pursuant to New York’s turbocharged 
Martin Act.43 For example, Spitzer pursued major brokerage houses 
for allegedly producing biased analyst research.44 He also pursued 
                                                                                                                     
 40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b) & 78bb(f)(1) (2006). SLUSA contains important carve-outs for 
traditional state corporate law litigation. Id. §§ 77p(d) & 78bb(f)(3).  
 41. See id. §§ 77p(f)(3) & 78bb(f)(5)(E).  
 42. Id. § 77r(c)(1) (“Consistent with this section, the securities commission (or any 
agency or office performing like functions) of any State shall retain jurisdiction under the laws 
of such State to investigate and bring enforcement actions with respect to fraud or deceit, or 
unlawful conduct by a broker or dealer, in connection with securities or securities transactions.”) 
(NSMIA); id. § 77p(e) (“The securities commission (or any agency or office performing like 
functions) of any State shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State to investigate and 
bring enforcement actions.”) (SLUSA). Companies whose shares trade nationally are 
necessarily within the potential jurisdictional reach of all fifty states. See Michael A. Perino, 
Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 273, 326 (1998).  
 43. The Martin Act grants the New York attorney general broad powers to investigate 
securities fraud. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (2012);  N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63 (2012). 
Prosecutions under the Act require no showing of scienter or intent to defraud, and its use of the 
term “fraud” and “fraudulent practices” is read to “include all deceitful practices contrary to the 
plain rules of common honesty.” People v. Cadplaz Sponsors, Inc., 330 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 
(1972).  
 44. The analyst research scandal involved alleged conflicts of interest between brokerage 
firms’ investment banking and securities research arms. Specifically, these firms were alleged to 
have disseminated biased research that favored their investment banking clients and helped to 
attract future underwriting business. Eliot Spitzer, acting as NYAG, is widely credited with 
bringing the scandal to the public’s attention in 2002, though the SEC had been actively 
studying the problem of analyst conflicts of interest and appropriate regulatory responses since 
1999. See Regulation Analyst Certification, [Rel. No. 33-8119] (proposed Aug. 2, 2002) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8119.htm#. 
Spitzer’s investigation of Merrill Lynch uncovered sensational internal emails in which analysts 
derided as pieces of “junk” companies whose securities they rated as a buy. Spitzer’s efforts 
caught the attention of other regulators, and a coordinated investigation into the rest of the 
industry was launched, with the SEC, NASD, NYSE, NYAG, and nine other states splitting up 
the investigative burden. See The Investigation: How Eliot Spitzer Humbled Wall Street, THE 
NEW YORKER 54 (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/04/07/03 
17
Rose and LeBlanc: Policing Public Companies: An Empirical Examination of the Enforc
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
412 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
several major mutual fund advisors for allegedly permitting favored 
fund investors to engage in late trading and market timing, 
undisclosed practices that diluted the returns of longer-term investors.45 
Some lauded Spitzer’s actions as promoting the goal of optimal 
                                                                                                                     
0407fa_fact_cassidy?currentPage=all. In 2003, ten of the largest Wall Street brokerage firms 
reached a “global settlement” to resolve biased research allegations with the SEC, NASD, 
NYSE, National Association of State Securities Administrators (NASAA), and regulators from 
all fifty states. See SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements, SEC (Apr. 28, 
2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm. The settlement involved an unprecedented 
collective payment in excess of $1.4 billion and sweeping structural reforms to prevent the 
firms’ investment banking arms from unduly influencing analyst research. See Press Release, 
N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., Sec, NY Attorney General, NASD, NASAA, NYSE and 
State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement To Reform Investment Practices (Dec. 20, 
2002), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/sec-ny-attorney-general-nasd-nasaa-nyse 
-and-state-regulators-announce-historic (describing the terms of the settlement). The settlement 
also banned the settling firms from allocating IPO shares to corporate officials in a position to 
influence their company’s hiring of investment bankers—a practice known as “IPO Spinning.” 
See id. In addition to these regulatory efforts, Spitzer’s revelations also led to the filing of 313 
class actions related to biased analyst research as well as 68 class actions related to the 
allocation of shares in IPOs. See generally Stanford Law School Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, http://securities.stanford.edu.  
 45. Market timing and late trading are trading strategies that exploit the way open-end 
mutual fund shares are priced. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. 
Ct. 2296, 2300 n.1 (2011). Both practices can dilute the value of a mutual fund to the detriment 
of its other investors. On September 3, 2003 then-NYAG Eliot Spitzer publicly released a 
complaint against (and simultaneous $40 million settlement with) hedge fund Canary Capital 
Partners, accusing Canary of late trading certain Bank of America mutual funds in collusion 
with the funds’ investment advisor. See Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., 
State Investigation Reveals Mutual Fund Fraud (Sept. 3, 2003), available at http://www.ag.ny 
.gov/press-release/state-investigation-reveals-mutual-fund-fraud. The Canary Complaint also 
accused numerous other mutual fund investment advisors of allowing favored investors to 
engage in market timing in violation of policies spelled out in the managed funds’ prospectuses. 
In return for this privilege, the favored investors allegedly promised to invest so-called “sticky 
assets” in high-fee money market or hedge funds also managed by the investment advisor. See 
Complaint at 3–4, 12, State v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003), available at 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/press-releases/archived/canary_complaint.pdf. Spitzer’s 
complaint against Canary garnered significant media attention and prompted the SEC to conduct 
a large-scale examination of the mutual fund industry. See Stephen M. Cutler, SEC Director, 
Div. of Enforcement, Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks Before The National Regulatory Services 
Investment Adviser and Broker-Dealer Compliance/Risk Management Conference (Sept. 9, 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ speech/spch090903smc.htm. By the end of 2004, 
the SEC had brought twenty-nine market timing cases and ordered a total of $552 million in 
disgorgement and an additional $480 million in penalties. See SEC 2004 Performance & 
Accountability Report, SEC, 24 (May 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/ 
secpar04.pdf. Spitzer’s release of the Canary Complaint also prompted a flood of private 
litigation—according to court records, a total of 438 cases were consolidated into market timing 
multi-district litigation proceedings in the District of Maryland. MDL Statistics Report—
Distribution of Pending MDL Dockets, UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/Pending_MDL_Dockets-By-District-January-2013.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2013) (on file with authors).  
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deterrence at a time when the SEC was asleep at the switch; others 
criticized his actions as politically motivated and ultimately harmful 
to  t h e  U . S .  capital markets.46 The New York Attorney General’s 
office continues to make controversial enforcement decisions, 
provoking calls for reform by industry groups.47 For example, 
during his recent stint as New York Attorney General, Andrew 
Cuomo grabbed headlines by filing a lawsuit against Bank of America 
for fraud in connection with its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, 
notwithstanding that the SEC had already taken related action against 
the firm.48 He also opened investigations into the adequacy of 
disclosures by investment banks that sold mortgage-backed securities, a 
topic that has likewise gained the attention of the SEC and DOJ.49 
One thing the ongoing debate over the efficacy of NSMIA’s fraud 
carve-out has been missing is a more complete picture of the role state 
securities regulators have played in policing public companies. While 
we are generally aware of New York’s activity, what—if anything—
have the rest of the states been doing? What type of public companies 
have they targeted, and for what sort of misconduct? Is there a political 
dimension to states’ observed enforcement activity? In this Part, we 
report statistics generated by our data that shed light on these and other 
questions.  
As reported in Table 4, the companies in our dataset disclosed 102 
distinct securities-related state regulatory investigations or actions, by 
which we mean unique company–state–topic combinations.50 This 
understates the true number, because companies occasionally disclosed 
that they were responding to subpoenas and other requests for 
information from “state regulators,” or that they had reached a 
settlement with “state regulators,” without specifying these regulators’ 
                                                                                                                     
 46. See Eric Zitzewitz, An Eliot Effect? Prosecutorial Discretion in Mutual Fund 
Settlement Negotiations 2–3 nn.1–3 (Dartmouth Coll., Working Paper, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1091035 (collecting news stories reflecting 
these views).  
 47. See, e.g., Robert A. McTamaney, New York’s Martin Act: Preemption Delayed is 
Justice Denied, 26 WASH. LEGAL FOUND. LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 1, 2 (Mar. 25, 2011).  
 48. See Kara Scannell & Dan Fitzpatrick, SEC Clashes With Cuomo Over Firing In BofA 
Case, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2010, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB200014240 
52748703444804575071372283031624.html.  
 49. See John C. Coffee, The Spitzer Legacy And The Cuomo Future, N.Y. L.J. 1, 2 (Mar. 
20, 2008); Amir Efrati, et al., Prosecutors Widen Probes Into Subprime, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 
2008, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120244312394153109.html. A joint 
federal–state task force has recently been created to deal with these issues. See Attorney General 
Eric Holder, Attorney General Holder Speaks at the Announcement of the Financial Fraud 
Enforcement Task Force’s New Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Working Group (Jan. 
27, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-120127.html.  
 50. Several companies reported being targeted by multiple states, or by the same state 
with respect to different types of misconduct. See infra note 72.  
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identities. When a company made such a disclosure, and we could not 
identify the specific states by reviewing the company’s earlier or later 
public filings, we counted it only once for purposes of this tally and we 
did not attribute the action to any particular state. Also, occasionally a 
company listed a variety of states that were investigating multiple 
different matters, some securities-related and others not.51 When this 
occurred and we could not disentangle the regulators by reviewing the 
company’s earlier or later public filings, we counted each disclosed 
securities-related matter once for purposes of this tally and we did not 
attribute the action to any particular state. As a result, we did not 
attribute a total of twelve securities-related state regulatory matters to 




Table 4. Number of Disclosed Securities-Related  
State Regulatory Matters 
 
Total 102 
Attributable to Particular States 90 
 
While slightly understated, these figures are clearly extremely small. 
As Table 5 shows, the average number of attributed securities-related 
state actions or investigations disclosed in the dataset on a per state 
basis is only 1.8; it drops to 1.2 if New York is excluded. And this 
covers a three-year time period. 
 
Table 5. Disclosed Securities-Related State 
Regulatory Matters: Per State Average 
 
 Mean (Standard Deviation) 
Including All States 1.8 (5.0)
Excluding New York 1.2 (2.7)
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 51. For example, insurance companies sometimes lumped state investigations into their 
contingent commission arrangements together with investigations into their sale of 
“nontraditional” insurance products—allegedly sold to help companies cook their books. As 
explained supra in note 17, we treat the latter but not the former as “securities-related.”  
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But as the standard deviations also reported in Table 5 suggest, there is 
considerable variation across states. Table 6, which breaks down in 
descending order of prevalence the disclosed securities-related state 
matters attributable to each state, makes this variation apparent. As one 
might predict, New York tops the list as the most active state, 
responsible for 34% of these matters. More surprisingly, West Virginia 
comes in second with 16%. Connecticut and Massachusetts also have 
relatively strong showings, but the remaining forty-six states show 
much less activity—indeed, thirty-two states were not reported to have 
brought any securities-related enforcement actions or investigations 
against the companies in our dataset.52 Table 6 also reports whether the 
primary securities regulator in each state is appointed or elected and, if 
elected, whether the regulator during the time frame examined was a 













                                                                                                                     
 52. Of course, this does not mean that these states’ securities regulators were not hard at 
work; the more appropriate inference is that they were directing their scarce resources to 
securities-related misconduct of a more local ilk. For example, states have played an important 
role in protecting elders from securities scams as well as in policing for fraud in the sale of 
unregistered securities. See N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASSOC. ENFORCEMENT SECTION, 2010 
ENFORCEMENT REP. 2, available at http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/2010-
Enforcement-Report.pdf (reporting that a majority of states’ securities fraud cases “featured 
unregistered individuals selling unregistered securities”).  
 53. If the party affiliation of the elected official with primary responsibility for enforcing 
a state’s securities laws changed over the time period examined (2004–2006), we used the party 
of the enforcer that served during a majority of the time period. This was an issue with respect 
to only two states. In Delaware, a Republican stepped down as attorney general at the end of 
2005 and was replaced with a Democrat (we thus treat Delaware as having a Republican 
enforcer); in Missouri, a Democrat was elected Secretary of State in November 2004 to replace 
a Republican (we thus treat Missouri as having a Democrat enforcer). Arizona is unique in that 
the regulator with primary securities enforcement authority is a popularly elected five-person 
commission; because all commissioners were Republican during the time period examined, we 
treat Arizona as having a Republican enforcer.  
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Table 6. Disclosed Securities-Related  
State Regulatory Matters by State 
State E (R/D) or A No. % 
 
State E (R/D) or A No. % 
N.Y. E (D) 31 34.4% Iowa A 0 0.0% 
W.Va. E (D) 14 15.6% Ky. A 0 0.0% 
Conn. E (D) 10 11.1% La. A 0 0.0% 
Mass. E (D) 8 8.9% Me. A 0 0.0% 
Fla. A 4 4.4% Md. E (D) 0 0.0% 
Ill. E (D) 4 4.4% Mich. A 0 0.0% 
N.J. A 3 3.3% Miss. E (D) 0 0.0% 
Vt. A 3 3.3% Mo. E (D) 0 0.0% 
Ga. E (D) 2 2.2% Mont. E (D) 0 0.0% 
Minn. A 2 2.2% Neb. A 0 0.0% 
N.H. A 2 2.2% Nev. E (R) 0 0.0% 
Cal. E (D) 1 1.1% N.M. A 0 0.0% 
Colo. A 1 1.1% N.C. E (D) 0 0.0% 
Ind. E (R) 1 1.1% N.D. A 0 0.0% 
Kan. A 1 1.1% Ohio A 0 0.0% 
Okla. A 1 1.1% Or. A 0 0.0% 
S.C. E (R) 1 1.1% Pa. A 0 0.0% 
Utah A 1 1.1% R.I. A 0 0.0% 
Ala. A 0 0.0% S.D. A 0 0.0% 
Alaska A 0 0.0% Tenn. A 0 0.0% 
Ariz. E (R) 0 0.0% Tex. A 0 0.0% 
Ark. A 0 0.0% Va. A 0 0.0% 
Del. E (R) 0 0.0% Wash. A 0 0.0% 
Haw. A 0 0.0% Wis. A 0 0.0% 
Idaho A 0 0.0% Wyo. E (R) 0 0.0% 
 
Elected state regulators differ from appointed state regulators in a 
variety of ways. They are directly accountable to voters. They must run 
a potentially costly campaign to obtain and retain their positions, an 
endeavor which may require them to seek contributions from various 
interest groups. Elected state regulators may be more likely to aspire to 
higher elected office than their appointed counterparts. Do the political 
forces that only elected enforcers confront lead to differences in 
enforcement behavior? Our data suggest they might. As demonstrated in 
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Table 7, the percentage of matters brought against the public companies 
in our dataset attributable to states with an elected securities regulator 
far exceeds the percentage of states with an appointed securities 
regulator. States with elected securities regulators remain 
overrepresented even if we exclude New York.54  
 
 
Table 7. Disclosed Securities Enforcement Activity by States 
with an Elected Securities Regulator 
 All States Excluding NY 
States with Elected Official 36.0% (n=18/50)
34.7%  
(n=17/49) 







During the time period we examined, the SEC and the Presidency 
were both controlled by Republicans. Did the enforcement behavior of 
states with an elected Democrat serving as the state securities regulator 
differ from the enforcement behavior of other states? Our data suggest 
that party affiliation may indeed have affected the enforcement behavior 
of elected state securities regulators. As reported in Table 8, our data 
indicates that states with elected Democrats serving as their primary 
securities regulator were much more active in policing public 
companies for securities-related misconduct than their representation 
among all states, or even among the subset of states with elected 
enforcers, would predict. Specifically, 24% of states had an elected 
Democrat serving as the state securities regulator, yet these states were 
responsible for 78% of the total number of state regulatory matters 
attributable to particular states. Whereas 66% of the subset of states 
with an elected securities regulator had a Democrat serving in the 
position during the time period examined, states with elected Democrats 
were responsible for 97% of the state regulatory matters attributable to 
states with an elected regulator. States with an elected Democrat serving 





                                                                                                                     
 54. New York’s uniquely powerful Martin Act may set it apart from other states. See 
supra note 43.  
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Table 8. Disclosed Securities Enforcement Activity by States with an 
Elected Democrat as Securities Regulator 







































Any relationship between the elected status of a state’s securities 
enforcer, or his status as an elected Democrat, and the level of a state’s 
observed enforcement activity might, of course, be attributable to 
random chance. It might also disappear if other state characteristics 
likely to impact enforcement intensity are taken into account. Such 
characteristics might include population, as states with larger 
populations internalize a larger portion of the harm caused by public 
companies’ securities-related misconduct, and thus might invest more in 
deterrence. Per capita government expenditures might also influence 
enforcement intensity; states that spend more likely devote more 
resources to securities enforcement vis-à-vis all companies, including 
public companies. The level of a state’s enforcement activity might also 
change with the number of public companies headquartered in the state, 
or the percentage of state GDP attributable to the financial sector, 
though it is difficult to know in which directions these particular factors 
will cut.55  
                                                                                                                     
 55. The number of public companies headquartered in a state might bear a positive 
relationship to the level of a state’s enforcement activity, if being home to public companies 
makes a state more sensitive to the cost of capital, and if greater enforcement helps reduce the 
cost of capital (by, for example, increasing investors’ confidence in company disclosures). 
Similarly, the dependence of a state’s economy on the financial sector might bear a positive 
relationship to the level of a state’s enforcement activity, if greater enforcement benefits the 
financial sector (by, for example, increasing confidence in the markets and hence the number of 
financial transactions). Conversely, both factors might bear a negative relationship to 
enforcement activity if they increase the likelihood that a state is “captured” by managerial 
interests who prefer lax enforcement, or if greater enforcement is not in fact beneficial in the 
ways assumed above.  
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We ran regressions to account for these possibilities. We selected a 
negative binomial model because our variable of interest is over-
dispersed count data, specifically the number of state actions and 
investigations brought by each state.56 In our first regression, the 
independent variables were: (1) whether the state enforcer was elected 
rather than appointed;57 (2) the log of the state population;58 (3) state 
general expenditures per capita;59 (4) the number of companies in our 
dataset headquartered in the state;60 and (5) the percentage of state GDP 
attributable to the financial sector.61 The results, reported in the 
Appendix at Table A.12, show a statistically significant relationship 
between the elected status of a state’s enforcer and the number of 
enforcement actions and investigations brought by the state. No other 
independent variable had a statistically significant impact. The 
coefficients in a negative binomial regression are difficult to interpret, 
as they represent the difference in the logs of expected counts of the 
dependent variable given a change in the particular independent variable 
to which the coefficient attaches.62 It is therefore useful to convert the 
coefficients into incident rate ratios (IRRs). In this regression, the IRR 
for the elected state enforcer independent variable was 4.26. This means 
                                                                                                                     
 56. See, e.g., A.C. CAMERON AND P.K. TRIVEDI, REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COUNT DATA 
70–71 (1998). This model fit better than alternatives we tried, including Poisson. The p-value 
for the chi-square was 0.0321 in the first regression discussed in the text and 0.0071 in the 
second, suggesting that in both cases the model as a whole was statistically significant.  
 57. See supra note 28; supra Table 6. 
 58. We took the 2004–2006 average of each state’s population, data we obtained from the 
Census Bureau’s website. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/ (last visited Nov. 
5, 2012).  
 59. We took the 2004–2006 average of each state’s general expenditures, data we also 
obtained from the Census Bureau’s website, and divided by the 2004–2006 average population. 
See id.; see also, e.g., States Ranked by Revenue and Expenditure Total Amount and Per Capita 
Total Amount: 2004, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 14, 2010), http://www.census.gov/govs/state/ 
04rank.html.  
 60. We took the 2004–2006 average of the figures reported in Table A.4.  
 61. We took each state’s total 2004–2006 GDP attributable to companies falling under the 
North American Industry Classification System’s (NAICS) code for “finance and insurance” 
and divided by each state’s total 2004–2006 annual GDP, data we obtained from the website of 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. See BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, www.bea.gov (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2012). The NAICS defines the finance and insurance sector as comprising 
“establishments primarily engaged in financial transactions (transactions involving the creation, 
liquidation, or change in ownership of financial assets) and/or in facilitating financial 
transactions.” See 2007 NAICS Definition, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?code= 52&search=2007 NAICS Search (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).  
 62. In a negative binomial regression, “the dependent variable is a count variable that is 
either over- or under-dispersed, and the model models the log of the expected count as a 
function of the predictor variables.” State Annotated Output Negative Binomial Regression, 
UCLA ACAD. TECH. SERVS., http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/stata_nbreg_output.htm 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2012).  
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that states with an elected securities regulator brought enforcement 
actions and investigations at a rate more than four times that of states 
with an appointed securities regulator, holding the other variables in the 
model constant.63  
We ran a second regression to explore the relationship between 
partisan affiliation and enforcement behavior. In this regression we used 
the same variables as in the first, except we replaced the dummy 
variable “elected rather than appointed” with the dummy variable 
“elected and Democrat.”64 The results, reported in the Appendix at 
Table A.13, show a highly statistically significant relationship between 
the status of a state’s securities regulator as an elected Democrat and the 
number of actions and investigations brought by the state. The IRR for 
the elected Democrat independent variable was 6.84, meaning that 
states with elected Democrats serving as their securities regulator 
brought enforcement actions and investigations at a rate nearly seven 
times that of other states, holding the other variables in the model 
constant.65 This finding is highly statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. Again, no other independent variable displayed a statistically 
significant relationship to the number of enforcement actions brought.66  
Another notable characteristic of the disclosed state actions and 
investigations concerns the frequency with which they overlapped with 
other enforcement efforts. As noted in Part II, nearly 100% of the 
companies that disclosed being the target of a state regulatory 
investigation or action reported being targeted by at least one other 
securities enforcer over the course of the three-year period examined (as 
compared to 56% for all companies disclosing some form of securities 
                                                                                                                     
 63. These results persisted when New York was excluded as an outlier, except the model 
overall lost statistical significance.  
 64. Another approach would have been to include the political affiliation of the enforcer 
(Democrat or Republican) and the type of enforcer (appointed or elected) and create interaction 
variables. But assigning a political affiliation to appointed enforcers is an uncertain task. Should 
an appointed enforcer’s personal political affiliation be referenced, or rather the political 
affiliation of the person or entity that appointed him? The former data is not consistently 
available, and is likely less relevant to enforcement behavior than the political affiliation of the 
appointing person or entity. But if the political affiliation of the appointing person or entity were 
used, the political affiliation variable would not have a consistent meaning across enforcer 
types. We had too few observations to run a meaningful regression focused only on the subset of 
states with elected enforcers.  
 65. It is possible that state securities regulators who are elected Democrats are always 
more active than securities regulators who are either elected Republicans or appointed, or it may 
be the case that they are more active when the SEC and the Presidency are controlled by 
Republicans—which was the case during the 2004–2006 time frame examined. Without data on 
state enforcement efforts during a time period when the SEC and the Presidency were controlled 
by Democrats, we cannot separate out these two possibilities.  
 66. Again, these results persisted when New York was excluded as an outlier, except the 
model overall lost statistical significance.  
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litigation).67 As Table T.9 demonstrates, our review of these companies’ 
disclosures reveals that they were targeted by at least one other 
securities enforcer with respect to the same or related misconduct a 
remarkable 93% of the time. They faced overlapping enforcement by 
public or quasi-public federal regulators 91% of the time and by private 
enforcers 67% of the time. 
 
Table 9. Disclosed Securities-Related State  
Regulatory Matters: Percentage Involving  
Overlapping Enforcement Efforts 
 
Related Litigation by at Least One Other Enforcer 93.14% 
Related Federal Regulatory Matter 91.18% 
Related Private Litigation 66.67% 
 
This degree of overlap is perhaps more understandable once the 
topics of the state investigations and actions are taken into 
consideration. As reported in Figure 1, 85% of the disclosed state 
investigations and actions related to just four highly publicized industry-
wide scandals, each scandal at a slightly different stage of its life cycle 
in the time period examined: (1) the mutual fund industry scandal over 
market timing and late trading (46%);68 (2) the insurance industry 
scandal involving the use of nontraditional insurance products to 
manipulate financial results (17%);69 (3) the investment banking scandal 
                                                                                                                     
 67. See supra Table 2 and accompanying text.  
 68. See supra note 45.  
 69. The SEC began investigating the use of so-called “nontraditional” or “finite” 
insurance products to manipulate financial results in early 2001. See Stipulated Order on 
Application to Enforce Administrative Subpoenas and Prevent Destruction of Documents at 1, 
SEC v. Greenburg, No. M-18-304 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/complaints/comp 19176.pdf (indicating that the SEC had “issued a formal order of 
investigation in the Matter of Certain Loss Mitigation Unit Insurance Products” in March 2001). 
Finite insurance (and reinsurance) limits substantially the loss the insurer (or reinsurer) can 
suffer. Typically, a corporation will pay a large premium likely to cover all losses into an 
account held with the insurer; “[i]f the cost of losses turns out to be less than the premium, the 
carrier gives back the difference to the insured; if the losses turn out to be greater, the insured 
pays an additional premium to the insurer.” David M. Katz, Finite Insurance: Beyond the 
Scandals, CFO.COM (Apr. 14, 2005), http://www3.cfo.com/article.cfm/3860547?currpage=0. 
Finite products thus can resemble a deposit–loan arrangement more than a true risk-shifting 
insurance transaction, but allow purchasers to utilize the different accounting treatment that 
applies to insurance. See generally The Regulatory Implications of Finite Reinsurance (Nov. 
2005), http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2005 /13067.pdf. In 2003, the SEC brought 
suit against American International Group (AIG) and Brightpoint, Inc., alleging that AIG had 
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over biased analyst research and IPO allocation practices (9%);70; and 
(4) the mutual fund industry scandal over certain marketing practices, 
such as directed brokerage (8%).71 An additional six actions (6%) 
                                                                                                                     
fashioned and sold Brightpoint “a purported ‘insurance’ product that Brightpoint used to report 
false and misleading financial information to the public.” See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges 
American International Group and Others in Brightpoint Securities Fraud (Sept. 11, 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-111.htm. The action, which AIG and 
Brightpoint ultimately settled for $10 million and $450,000 in civil penalties, respectively, 
heightened regulatory interest in the use of finite insurance products, and led to further 
investigations of (and enforcement actions against) AIG by the SEC, DOJ, and NYAG, as well 
as a broader probe of the insurance industry by these and other regulators. See, e.g., Patrick 
Jenkins, Spitzer Probe Hits Finite Reinsurance, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2005), available at 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/baaf6aae-0a9b-11da-aa9b-00000e2511c8.html#axzz2BTKwftrk 
(observing that “[d]ozens of reinsurers, primary insurers and brokers have been drawn into the 
investigation”); SEC’s Insurance Inquiry Includes General Re, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2004), 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2004/dec/31/business/fi-berkshire31 (“Regulators, including 
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, have subpoenaed or requested information from 
several insurers on [finite] policies, which are being scrutinized as a possible way for companies 
to hide losses.”).  
 70. See supra note 44.  
 71. An open-end mutual fund’s investment advisor benefits when brokers successfully 
market fund shares, because the advisor’s compensation is typically based on total fund assets 
under management—and fund assets grow as fund shares are sold. A mutual fund’s investment 
advisor also generally controls which brokers the fund selects to effect commission-generating 
transactions in its underlying securities. Thus, a potential conflict of interest exists, as a fund’s 
investment advisor may direct the fund’s brokerage needs not based on what is in the best 
interest of the fund, but instead based on the efforts brokers have made to market the fund’s 
shares. The investment advisor can also reward brokers for their marketing efforts in other ways 
that are not always transparent to fund investors or the public. See John P. Freeman, The Mutual 
Fund Distribution Expense Mess, 32 J. CORP. L. 739, 791–99 (2007) (discussing the use of 
revenue-sharing and soft-dollar arrangements). This, in turn, can incentivize brokers to push 
their clients to select mutual funds based not on what is in the client’s best interest, but instead 
based on which funds have promised the broker the best reward. A complex web of SEC and 
NASD rules have long existed to deal with these structural conflicts, and both regulators had 
been reviewing their efficacy prior to the release of Spitzer’s Canary Complaint in September 
2003. But in the wake of the Canary Complaint, and the increased public scrutiny of the mutual 
fund industry it prompted, regulatory focus on the conflicts surrounding mutual fund marketing 
intensified. See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Has Found Payoffs in Sales of Mutual Funds, N. Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at A1 (noting that the SEC had been focusing on these issues since April 
2003, but the inquiries “gained urgency” in September); see also D. Bruce Johnsen, The SEC’s 
Mistaken Ban on Directed Brokerage: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1241, 
1247–67 (2008). The SEC and NASD brought numerous enforcement actions against fund 
managers and brokers for failing to adequately disclose the basis upon which the funds’ 
brokerage business was directed, see George Serafeim, Directed Brokerage No More: The 
Effects of New Regulation in the Mutual Fund Industry, at Table 1 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working 
Papers Series, July 10, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1157917 
(identifying forty-three such actions, resulting in over $426 million in fines); new rules were 
enacted, see Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to Finance Distribution, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 54728, 54728 (Sept. 9, 2004); state regulatory interest in the matter was piqued, see, e.g., 
Tom Lauricella, California Tackles Disclosure Issues at Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J. , Sept. 16, 
2004, at C1; and class actions were filed, see, e.g., Edward Jones Agrees to Settle 9 Lawsuits, 
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related to one of the two mutual fund industry scandals just mentioned, 
but ambiguity in the disclosures made it impossible for us to determine 
which. The remaining 15% of the disclosed state regulatory 
investigations and actions involved other types of misconduct. This 
subset also involved a large degree of overlap with federal regulatory 
efforts (73%), but less than did the group of state regulatory matters 




















   Figure 1 
Which types of companies did the states target? A couple of clear 
trends emerge from the data. First, 93% of the targeted firms hail from 
the financial sector, a result that is not surprising given that the topics of 
most of the state regulatory matters concerned scandals that beset that 
sector.72 Second, states most often targeted firms that were neither 
headquartered nor incorporated in their state, doing so in 68% of the 
disclosed matters attributable to particular states.73  
                                                                                                                     
WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2006, at C2. 
 72. When we refer to firms in the “financial sector,” we are referring to firms which the 
SEC’s Edgar database indicate have Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes falling under 
“Division H: Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate” in the Occupational Safety & Health 
Administration’s SIC Manual. See Division H: Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate, 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2012). Although there are 102 distinct state regulatory matters disclosed in our 
dataset, these were directed at only forty-two firms. The targeted firms, and their SIC codes, are 
reported in the appendix at Table A.11.  
 73. In calculating this figure, we considered a state as targeting a company headquartered 
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CONCLUSIONS & EXTENSIONS 
This Article substantiates the claim that U.S. public companies 
experience significant amounts of material litigation. In particular, they 
experience high levels of securities litigation—often at the hands of 
multiple different enforcers. Of the 1,977 public companies whose Form 
10-Ks we reviewed, 72% disclosed some form of material litigation 
over the three-year period examined, and 27% disclosed some form of 
securities litigation. Well over half of the companies that disclosed 
securities litigation reported facing two or more different forms of 
securities litigation over the course of the three-year period examined, 
and nearly 30% reported facing three or more. Many of these companies 
were likely targeted by different securities law enforcers with respect to 
the same or related misconduct. We know, for example, that the subset 
of companies disclosing a securities-related state regulatory action or 
investigation were targeted by another securities law enforcer with 
respect to the same or related misconduct a remarkable 93% of the time.  
These striking figures suggest it is worthwhile for policymakers to 
rethink the allocation of securities law enforcement authority in the 
United States—an allocation that currently has more to do with 
historical happenstance than thoughtful design choices.74 Questions 
worthy of further exploration include: What value is added when 
multiple enforcers target public firms for the same misconduct? Do 
different securities enforcers vindicate different normative aspirations? 
When it comes to imposing sanctions on public companies for 
securities-related misconduct, the argument has been made that the only 
sensible goal is deterrence, whether the litigation takes the form of a 
civil regulatory action, a criminal prosecution, or a private class action 
lawsuit.75 If this is the case, how does the use of multiple enforcers 
advance (or retard) the goal of optimal deterrence? One obvious 
response is that it guards against the underdeterrence that might arise 
should a single entity, such as the SEC, be granted an enforcement 
monopoly. But that answer is too facile, as it ignores the real costs that 
                                                                                                                     
or incorporated within the state if the reporting company was headquartered or incorporated 
within the enforcing state or if the action related to a subsidiary of the reporting company that 
was headquartered or incorporated within the enforcing state.  
 74. See, e.g., Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform, supra note 1, at 1310–15 
(discussing the historically contingent evolution of Rule 10b-5 class action enforcement).  
 75. See, e.g., id. at 1312–13 (discussing the consensus view that securities fraud class 
actions cannot be justified on compensatory grounds). A more nuanced version of this argument 
is that corporate sanctions can be justified as a means of deterring managers whose misbehavior 
is best viewed as a form of agency cost; holding the corporate entity (and, ultimately, its public 
shareholders) liable may aid in this endeavor if doing so produces information that allows 
shareholders to better discipline management. See Amanda M. Rose & Richard Squire, 
Intraportfolio Litigation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1679, 1680–81 (2011).  
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can result from the use of multiple enforcers.76 Further thought should 
be given to whether there are more efficient ways to guard against 
underdeterrence.77 
This Article also sheds light on what has heretofore been an 
empirical lacuna: the role played by state regulators in policing public 
companies for securities-related misconduct. Our data reveals that, at 
least in the time frame examined, state regulators were significantly less 
active than their private and federal counterparts. Most states were not 
identified as having brought any enforcement actions or investigations 
against the public companies in our dataset. The states that were so 
identified tended to target out-of-state firms (68%) and to focus their 
efforts on scandals that beset the financial industry and also caught the 
attention of other securities law enforcers. In 91% of the disclosed state 
matters, there was an overlapping federal action or investigation, and in 
67% there was overlapping private litigation. This does not reveal 
whether the state actions were largely redundant, or whether they 
mostly added value—by, for example, first exposing misconduct that 
would have otherwise gone undetected. Further research, including a 
qualitative review of the state matters disclosed in our dataset, could 
help shed light on the social value of NSMIA’s fraud carve-out, as well 
as provide insights into state regulatory behavior more broadly.78 
One thing our analysis does make clear is that, at least in the time 
period examined, state securities enforcement activity against public 
firms was more likely if the state securities enforcer served in an elected 
position than if he served in an appointed position, and more likely still 
if the enforcer was an elected Democrat. The statistically significant 
results of our regressions show that these sets of enforcers brought 
enforcement actions and investigations at roughly four and seven times 
the rate, respectively, of other enforcers, when controlling for other 
variables likely to influence enforcement intensity. This raises 
interesting questions worthy of further reflection. Why are these 
enforcers more active? What do their unique incentives tell us about the 
likely social value of state enforcement? The SEC was deliberately 
designed to be a politically insulated independent administrative 
agency. Might unleashing elected state regulators to supplement the 
SEC’s efforts upset the policy goals underlying that choice? If so, is this 
                                                                                                                     
 76. See supra note 1, Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence, 
at 2176 (exploring the costs of a multi-enforcer approach to securities fraud deterrence).  
 77. See, e.g., id. (exploring this question); Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform, 
supra note 1, at 1349 (suggesting ways to efficiently restructure the relationship between public 
and private securities fraud enforcement).  
 78. One of the authors has undertaken such an effort. See Amanda M. Rose, State 
Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities 
Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 1343.  
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cost outweighed by other benefits of state enforcement? Further 
qualitative review of the state actions disclosed in our dataset could help 
illuminate the answers to these important questions as well.79 
  
                                                                                                                     
 79. See id.  
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Table A.1. Percentage of Incorporations by State 
1 Delaware 58.7%  26 Kansas 0.3% 
2 Maryland 8.6%  27 Oklahoma 0.3% 
3 New York 3.1%  28 Arizona 0.2% 
4 Ohio 3.1%  29 Hawaii 0.2% 
5 Pennsylvania 2.4%  30 Louisiana 0.2% 
6 Texas 2.0%  31 Utah 0.2% 
7 Florida 1.7%  32 Vermont 0.2% 
8 Virginia 1.7%  33 Alabama 0.1% 
9 Nevada 1.6%  34 Colorado 0.1% 
10 Georgia 1.4%  35 Idaho 0.1% 
11 Wisconsin 1.4%  36 Kentucky 0.1% 
12 Massachusetts 1.2%  37 Mississippi 0.1% 
13 New Jersey 1.2%  38 Nebraska 0.1% 
14 Minnesota 1.1%  39 New Hampshire 0.1% 
15 California 1.0%  40 New Mexico 0.1% 
16 Indiana 1.0%  41 Rhode Island 0.1% 
17 Michigan 1.0%  42 South Carolina 0.1% 
18 North Carolina 1.0%  43 South Dakota 0.1% 
19 Missouri 0.8%  44 Wyoming 0.1% 
20 Washington 0.8%  45 Alaska 0.0% 
21 Tennessee 0.7%  46 Arkansas 0.0% 
22 Illinois 0.5%  47 Maine 0.0% 
23 Oregon 0.5%  48 Montana 0.0% 
24 Iowa 0.4%  49 North Dakota 0.0% 
25 Connecticut 0.3%  50 West Virginia 0.0% 
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Table A.2.  Incorporations by State: Year by Year Results 
 2004 2005 2006 
States # % # % # % 
Alabama 3 0.2% 2 0.1% 2 0.1% 
Alaska 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Arizona 4 0.2% 3 0.2% 3 0.2% 
Arkansas 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 
California 19 1.0% 18 1.0% 17 1.0% 
Colorado 2 0.1% 2 0.1% 3 0.2% 
Connecticut 6 0.3% 6 0.3% 6 0.3% 
Delaware 1066 57.8% 1067 58.6% 1063 59.8% 
Florida 35 1.9% 31 1.7% 29 1.6% 
Georgia 26 1.4% 25 1.4% 23 1.3% 
Hawaii 4 0.2% 4 0.2% 4 0.2% 
Idaho 2 0.1% 2 0.1% 2 0.1% 
Illinois 9 0.5% 9 0.5% 8 0.5% 
Indiana 19 1.0% 19 1.0% 18 1.0% 
Iowa 8 0.4% 8 0.4% 8 0.5% 
Kansas 5 0.3% 5 0.3% 5 0.3% 
Kentucky 2 0.1% 2 0.1% 1 0.1% 
Louisiana 4 0.2% 3 0.2% 3 0.2% 
Maine 2 0.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Maryland 161 8.7% 162 8.9% 145 8.2% 
Massachusetts 24 1.3% 23 1.3% 21 1.2% 
Michigan 17 0.9% 18 1.0% 17 1.0% 
Minnesota 21 1.1% 21 1.2% 20 1.1% 
Mississippi 2 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 
Missouri 15 0.8% 14 0.8% 15 0.8% 
Montana 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Nebraska 3 0.2% 2 0.1% 2 0.1% 
Nevada 29 1.6% 28 1.5% 29 1.6% 
New 
Hampshire 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 
New Jersey 22 1.2% 21 1.2% 21 1.2% 
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Table A.2.  Incorporations by State: Year by Year Results 
(cont’d)
 2004 2005 2006 
States # % # % # % 
New York 59 3.2 57 3.1 55 3.1 
North 
Carolina 18 1.0% 18 1.0% 17 1.0% 
North 
Dakota 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Ohio 57 3.1% 57 3.1% 54 3.0% 
Oklahoma 6 0.3% 6 0.3% 7 0.4% 
Oregon 9 0.5% 9 0.5% 9 0.5% 
Pennsylvania 44 2.4% 43 2.4% 41 2.3% 
Rhode Island 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 
South 
Carolina 3 0.2% 3 0.2% 2 0.1% 
South 
Dakota 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 2 0.1% 
Tennessee 13 0.7% 13 0.7% 11 0.6% 
Texas 38 2.1% 36 2.0% 35 2.0% 
Utah 4 0.2% 4 0.2% 4 0.2% 
Vermont 3 0.2% 3 0.2% 3 0.2% 
Virginia 32 1.7% 31 1.7% 31 1.7% 
Washington 14 0.8% 14 0.8% 13 0.7% 
West 
Virginia 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Wisconsin 26 1.4% 24 1.3% 24 1.4% 
Wyoming 2 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 
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Table A.3. Percentage of Headquarters by State 
1 Texas 12.4% 26 Oklahoma 0.9% 
2 New York 10.6% 27 Iowa 0.8% 
3 California 10.0% 28 Louisiana 0.8% 
4 Illinois 5.8% 29 Oregon 0.8% 
5 Pennsylvania 5.3% 30 Kentucky 0.7% 
6 Ohio 4.9% 31 Nebraska 0.7% 
7 New Jersey 4.3% 32 Delaware 0.5% 
8 Florida 3.8% 33 South Carolina 0.5% 
9 Georgia 3.2% 34 Utah 0.5% 
10 Connecticut 3.0% 35 Arkansas 0.4% 
11 Massachusetts 2.8% 36 Hawaii 0.4% 
12 Virginia 2.8% 37 Kansas 0.4% 
13 Michigan 2.6% 38 Idaho 0.3% 
14 Missouri 2.3% 39 Mississippi 0.3% 
15 Minnesota 2.2% 40 New Hampshire 0.3% 
16 North Carolina 2.1% 41 Rhode Island 0.3% 
17 Tennessee 1.9% 42 Maine 0.2% 
18 Colorado 1.8% 43 Vermont 0.2% 
19 Indiana 1.6% 44 Montana 0.1% 
20 Maryland 1.6% 45 New Mexico 0.1% 
21 Wisconsin 1.5% 46 North Dakota 0.1% 
22 Arizona 1.2% 47 South Dakota 0.1% 
23 Washington 1.1% 48 Alaska 0.0% 
24 Alabama 1.0% 49 West Virginia 0.0% 
25 Nevada 1.0% 50 Wyoming 0.0% 
Note: For the method of computation, see supra note 31. 
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Table A.4.  Headquarters by State: Year by Year Results 
2004 2005 2006 
States # % # % # % 
Alabama 13 0.7% 13 0.7% 11 0.6% 
Alaska 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Arizona 24 1.3% 21 1.2% 21 1.2% 
Arkansas 8 0.4% 7 0.4% 7 0.4% 
California 195 10.6% 186 10.2% 164 9.2% 
Colorado 33 1.8% 33 1.8% 31 1.7% 
Connecticut 56 3.0% 54 3.0% 54 3.0% 
Delaware 10 0.5% 9 0.5% 9 0.5% 
Florida 73 4.0% 69 3.8% 65 3.7% 
Georgia 60 3.3% 61 3.4% 55 3.1% 
Hawaii 7 0.4% 7 0.4% 6 0.3% 
Idaho 6 0.3% 6 0.3% 5 0.3% 
Illinois 102 5.5% 107 5.9% 104 5.9% 
Indiana 32 1.7% 29 1.6% 28 1.6% 
Iowa 14 0.8% 14 0.8% 13 0.7% 
Kansas 7 0.4% 6 0.3% 8 0.5% 
Kentucky 13 0.7% 14 0.8% 12 0.7% 
Louisiana 16 0.9% 16 0.9% 14 0.8% 
Maine 3 0.2% 3 0.2% 3 0.2% 
Maryland 27 1.5% 31 1.7% 29 1.6% 
Massachusetts 56 3.0% 53 2.9% 46 2.6% 
Michigan 47 2.6% 48 2.6% 48 2.7% 
Minnesota 40 2.2% 41 2.3% 40 2.3% 
Mississippi 7 0.4% 6 0.3% 6 0.3% 
Missouri 44 2.4% 40 2.2% 39 2.2% 
Montana 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 
Nebraska 14 0.8% 13 0.7% 11 0.6% 
Nevada 19 1.0% 17 0.9% 17 1.0% 
New 
Hampshire 7 0.4% 6 0.3% 5 0.3% 
New Jersey 76 4.1% 78 4.3% 82 4.6% 
New Mexico 2 0.1% 2 0.1% 2 0.1% 
New York 190 10.3% 194 10.7% 195 11.0% 
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Table A.4.  Headquarters by State: Year by Year Results (cont’d) 
 2004 2006 2006 
States # % # % # % 
North
Carolina 36 2.0% 39 2.1% 40 2.3% 
North Dakota 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 
Ohio 90 4.9% 89 4.9% 88 5.0% 
Oklahoma 16 0.9% 16 0.9% 17 1.0% 
Oregon 14 0.8% 14 0.8% 13 0.7% 
Pennsylvania 95 5.2% 94 5.2% 97 5.5% 
Rhode Island 7 0.4% 6 0.3% 5 0.3% 
South
Carolina 9 0.5% 9 0.5% 8 0.5% 
South Dakota 2 0.1% 2 0.1% 3 0.2% 
Tennessee 34 1.9% 35 1.9% 35 2.0% 
Texas 224 12.2% 219 12.0% 230 12.9% 
Utah 9 0.5% 9 0.5% 9 0.5% 
Vermont 4 0.2% 3 0.2% 3 0.2% 
Virginia 52 2.8% 52 2.9% 51 2.9% 
Washington 19 1.0% 20 1.1% 19 1.1% 
West Virginia 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 
Wisconsin 28 1.5% 27 1.5% 27 1.5% 
Wyoming 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
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Table A.5. Percentage of Companies Headquartered  
and Incorporated in a Single State 
Year All Companies Excluding Companies Incorporated In Delaware 
2004 29.1% 67.8% 
2005 28.5% 67.7% 
2006 27.7% 67.6% 
 
Table A.6. Percentage of Companies Headquartered  
and Incorporated in a Single State by State 
1 Ohio 9.9%  26 Connecticut 0.8% 
2 New York 7.9%  27 Hawaii 0.8% 
3 Texas 7.0%  28 Arizona 0.6% 
4 Pennsylvania 6.9%  29 Louisiana 0.6% 
5 Florida 5.6%  30 Utah 0.6% 
6 Wisconsin 4.7%  31 Vermont 0.6% 
7 Georgia 4.4%  32 South Carolina 0.5% 
8 Virginia 4.1%  33 Nebraska 0.5% 
9 Massachusetts 3.6%  34 Alabama 0.4% 
10 Minnesota 3.5%  35 Idaho 0.4% 
11 Michigan 3.4%  36 Kentucky 0.3% 
12 California 3.2%  37 Kansas 0.3% 
13 Maryland 3.2%  38 Mississippi 0.3% 
14 New Jersey 3.0%  39 South Dakota 0.3% 
15 Indiana 2.8%  40 New Hampshire 0.2% 
16 North Carolina 2.8%  41 New Mexico 0.2% 
17 Washington 2.5%  42 Rhode Island 0.2% 
18 Missouri 2.3%  43 Maine 0.1% 
19 Tennessee 2.2%  44 Colorado 0.1% 
20 Nevada 1.9%  45 Alaska 0.0% 
21 Delaware 1.7%  46 Arkansas 0.0% 
22 Oregon 1.7%  47 Montana 0.0% 
23 Iowa 1.6%  48 North Dakota 0.0% 
24 Illinois 1.5%  49 West Virginia 0.0% 
25 Oklahoma 1.0%  50 Wyoming 0.0% 
Note: For the method of computation, see supra note 32. 
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Table A.7. Companies Headquartered and Incorporated in a 
Single State by State: Year by Year Results 
 
2004 2005 2006 
States # % # % # % 
Alabama 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 
Alaska 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Arizona 4 1.0% 3 1.0% 3 1.0% 
Arkansas 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
California 18 3.0% 17 3.0% 15 3.0% 
Colorado 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Connecticut 4 1.0% 4 1.0% 4 1.0% 
Delaware 9 2.0% 9 2.0% 9 2.0% 
Florida 31 6.0% 28 5.0% 27 5.0% 
Georgia 24 4.0% 23 4.0% 21 4.0% 
Hawaii 4 1.0% 4 1.0% 4 1.0% 
Idaho 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 
Illinois 8 1.0% 8 2.0% 7 1.0% 
Indiana 15 3.0% 15 3.0% 14 3.0% 
Iowa 8 1.0% 8 2.0% 8 2.0% 
Kansas 2 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 
Kentucky 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 1 0.0% 
Louisiana 4 1.0% 3 1.0% 3 1.0% 
Maine 2 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Maryland 16 3.0% 19 4.0% 15 3.0% 
Massachusetts 20 4.0% 19 4.0% 17 3.0% 
Michigan 17 3.0% 18 3.0% 17 3.0% 
Minnesota 18 3.0% 18 3.0% 18 4.0% 
Mississippi 2 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 
Missouri 12 2.0% 12 2.0% 12 2.0% 
Montana 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Nebraska 3 1.0% 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 
Nevada 10 2.0% 9 2.0% 10 2.0% 
New Hampshire 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 
New Jersey 16 3.0% 15 3.0% 15 3.0% 
New Mexico 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 
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Table A.7. Companies Headquartered and Incorporated in a 
Single State by State: Year by Year Results (cont’d) 
 2004 2005 2006 
States # % # % # % 
New York 42 8.0% 41 8.0% 39 8.0% 
North Carolina 15 3.0% 15 3.0% 14 3.0% 
North Dakota 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Ohio 52 10.0% 52 10.0% 49 10.0% 
Oklahoma 5 1.0% 5 1.0% 6 1.0% 
Oregon 9 2.0% 9 2.0% 9 2.0% 
Pennsylvania 36 7.0% 36 7.0% 34 7.0% 
Rhode Island 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 
South Carolina 3 1.0% 3 1.0% 2 0.0% 
South Dakota 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 2 0.0% 
Tennessee 12 2.0% 12 2.0% 10 2.0% 
Texas 38 7.0% 36 7.0% 35 7.0% 
Utah 3 1.0% 3 1.0% 3 1.0% 
Vermont 3 1.0% 3 1.0% 3 1.0% 
Virginia 22 4.0% 21 4.0% 20 4.0% 
Washington 13 2.0% 13 3.0% 12 2.0% 
West Virginia 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Wisconsin 25 5.0% 24 5.0% 23 5.0% 
Wyoming 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
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Table A.8. Percentage of Incorporations by State: 
Companies Incorporated Outside their Headquarters’ State 
Delaware 81.4%  Wisconsin 0.1% 
Maryland 10.7%  Wyoming 0.1% 
Nevada 1.5%  Alabama 0.0% 
New York 1.3%  Alaska 0.0% 
Virginia 0.8%  Arizona 0.0% 
Pennsylvania 0.6%  Hawaii 0.0% 
New Jersey 0.5%  Idaho 0.0% 
Ohio 0.4%  Iowa 0.0% 
Indiana 0.3%  Kentucky 0.0% 
Kansas 0.3%  Louisiana 0.0% 
Massachusetts 0.3%  Maine 0.0% 
Colorado 0.2%  Michigan 0.0% 
Connecticut 0.2%  Mississippi 0.0% 
Florida 0.2%  Montana 0.0% 
Georgia 0.2%  Nebraska 0.0% 
Minnesota 0.2%  NewHampshire 0.0% 
Missouri 0.2%  New Mexico 0.0% 
North Carolina 0.2%  North Dakota 0.0% 
Arkansas 0.1%  Oregon 0.0% 
California 0.1%  Rhode Island 0.0% 
Illinois 0.1%  SouthCarolina 0.0% 
Oklahoma 0.1%  South Dakota 0.0% 
Tennessee 0.1%  Texas 0.0% 
Utah 0.1%  Vermont 0.0% 
Washington 0.1%  West Virginia 0.0% 
Note: For the method of computation, see supra note 33. 
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Table A.9. Incorporations by State of Companies Incorporated 
Outside their Headquarters’ State: Year by Year Results 
 2004 2005 2006 
States # % # % # % 
Delaware 1057 81.1% 1058 81.4% 1054 82.0% 
Maryland 145 11.1% 143 11.0% 130 10.1% 
Nevada 19 1.5% 19 1.5% 19 1.5% 
New York 17 1.3% 16 1.2% 16 1.2% 
Virginia 10 0.8% 10 0.8% 11 0.9% 
Pennsylvania 8 0.6% 7 0.5% 7 0.5% 
New Jersey 6 0.5% 6 0.5% 6 0.5% 
Ohio 5 0.4% 5 0.4% 5 0.4% 
Indiana 4 0.3% 4 0.3% 4 0.3% 
Massachusetts 4 0.3% 4 0.3% 4 0.3% 
Kansas 3 0.2% 4 0.3% 4 0.3% 
Florida 4 0.3% 3 0.2% 2 0.2% 
North 
Carolina 3 0.2% 3 0.2% 3 0.2% 
Minnesota 3 0.2% 3 0.2% 2 0.2% 
Missouri 3 0.2% 2 0.2% 3 0.2% 
Colorado 1 0.1% 2 0.2% 3 0.2% 
Connecticut 2 0.2% 2 0.2% 2 0.2% 
Georgia 2 0.2% 2 0.2% 2 0.2% 
California 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 2 0.2% 
Wyoming 2 0.2% 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 
Illinois 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 
Oklahoma 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 
Tennessee 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 
Utah 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 
Washington 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 
Arkansas 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 
Wisconsin 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 
Alabama 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Alaska 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Arizona 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Hawaii 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Idaho 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Iowa 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Kentucky 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Louisiana 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Maine 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
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Table A.9. Incorporations by State of Companies Incorporated 
Outside their Headquarters’ State: Year by Year Results (cont’d) 
 2004 2005 2006 
States # % # % # % 
Michigan 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Mississippi 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Montana 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Nebraska 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
New 
Hampshire 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
New Mexico 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
North Dakota 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Oregon 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Rhode Island 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
South 
Carolina 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
South Dakota 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Texas 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Vermont 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
West Virginia 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
 
 
Table A.10. Item 3 Litigation Disclosures: Year by Year Results 
 2004  2005  2006  
Litigation Type # % # % # % 
Any Material Litigation 1169 63.4% 1180 64.8% 1139 64.1% 
Securities Litigation 371 20.1% 380 20.9% 383 21.5% 
• Class Action 273 14.8% 277 15.2% 274 15.4% 
• Derivative 
Action 160 9.0% 172 9.0% 183 10.0% 
• Federal 
Regulatory 155 8.4% 169 9.3% 171 9.6% 
• State 
Regulatory 36 2.0% 33 1.8% 29 1.6% 
Note: Our dataset included a total of 1843 Form 10-Ks from FY 
2004, 1820 from FY 2005, and 1778 from FY 2006.
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Table A.11. Firms Targeted in Disclosed Securities-Related State 
Regulatory Matters with SIC Codes 
 Division E. Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, Gas, and 
Sanitary Services 
Williams Companies, Inc.  4922—Natural Gas Transmission 
The AES 
Corporation/IPALCO 
4991—Cogeneration Services & Small Power 
Producers 
 Division F: Wholesale Trade
Michael Stores, Inc. 5945—Retail-Hobby, Toy, & Game Shops 
 
Division H: Finance, Insurance, And Real 
Estate
 Major Group 60: Depository Institutions 
Bank of America Corporation 6021—National and Commercial Banks 
Citigroup Inc. 6021—National and Commercial Banks 
JPMorgan Chase & Co.  6021—National and Commercial Banks 
KeyCorp  6021—National and Commercial Banks 
PNC Financial Services 
Group Inc. 6021—National and Commercial Banks 
 Major Group 61: Non-depository Credit 
Institutions 
American Express 
Co./Ameriprise 6199—Finance Services 
The Bear Stearns Company 6189—Asset-Backed Secutities 
Astoria Financial Corporation 
6035—Savings Institution, Federally 
Chartered 
 
Major Group 62: Security And Commodity 
Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, And Services 
AllianceBernstein Holding 
L.P. 6282—Investment Advice 
Federated Investors, Inc. 6282—Investment Advice 
Franklin Resources Inc. 6282—Investment Advice 
Janus Capital Group Inc. 6282—Investment Advice 
Legg Mason Inc. 6282—Investment Advice 
BlackRock Inc. 
6211—Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation 
Companies 
GAMCO Investors, Inc. 
6211—Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation 
Companies 
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. 
6211—Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation 
Companies 
Morgan Stanley 
6211—Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation 
Companies 
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Table A.11. Firms Targeted in Disclosed Securities-Related State 
Regulatory Matters with SIC Codes (cont’d) 
Piper Jaffray Companies 
6211—Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation 
Companies 
Waddell & Reed Financial, 
Inc. 
6211—Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation 
Companies 
A.G. Edwards, Inc. 
6211—Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation 
Companies 
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 
6211—Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation 
Companies 
The Charles Schwab 
 Corporation 
6211—Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation 
Companies 
Credit Suisse First 
Boston, Inc.  
6200—Security & Commodity Brokers, 
Dealers, Exchanges & Services 
 Major Group 63: Insurance Carriers  
American International  
Group Inc. 6331—Fire, Marine & Casualty Insurance 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 6331—Fire, Marine & Casualty Insurance 
Chubb Corporation 6331—Fire, Marine & Casualty Insurance 
Travelers Companies Inc. 6331—Fire, Marine & Casualty Insurance 
Bristol West Holdings, Inc. 6331—Fire, Marine & Casualty Insurance 
UnitedHealth Group Inc. 6324—Hospital & Medical Service Plans 
CNO Financial Group, Inc. 6321—Accident & Health Insurance 
Lincoln National Corp. 6311—Life Insurance 
MetLife, Inc.  6311—Life Insurance 
Prudential Financial, Inc. 6311—Life Insurance 
AXA Financial, Inc.  6311—Life Insurance 
Nationwide Financial  
Servs., Inc. 6311—Life Insurance 
Phoenix Companies Inc.  6311—Life Insurance 
 
Major Group 64: Insurance Agents, Brokers, 
And Service 
Marsh & McLennan Cos., 
Inc.  6411—Insurance Agents, Brokers & Services 
MBIA Inc. 6351—Surety Insurance 
 Major Group 65: Real Estate 
W. P. Carey & Co. LLC 6500—Real Estate 
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Table A.12. Negative Binomial Regression Results for State 
Characteristics, Including Status of  





Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
Incident 
















0.1706 0.4207 1.1860 0.4990 
% State GDP – 
Finance Sector 0.7910 8.9752 2.2056 19.7960 
Constant -1.2441 11.5069 0.2882 3.3164 
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Table A.13. Negative Binomial Regression Results for State 
Characteristics, Including  
Status of Enforcer as Elected Democrat or Not, on Number of 





Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
Incident 

















0.1630 0.3703 1.1770 0.4358 
% State GDP – 
Finance Sector 1.3607 7.4017 3.8989 28.8580 
Constant -3.1301 10.1980 0.04371 0.4458 
Note: * p≤0.10, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.01
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